Description
In April 2008, contested election results and alleged electoral fraud in Moldova triggered public protests and political turmoil between activists and state authorities. Eventually, the Communist Party of then-President Vladimir Voronin was replaced it with a coalition called the Alliance for European Integration, which pushed for the implementation of a pro-EU coalition government. The term “Twitter Revolution” has become widely used to describe the movement due to the nature and importance of the revolution’s digital mobilization. Notably, multiple types of social media platforms were used to mobilize people to come out to the streets in protest, demanding positive change in 2009 and again in 2019. In the past, anti-corruption reforms were seldom implemented effectively, and often used solely to mask the underlying roots of kleptocratic systems. With the election of Maia Sandu as the President of Moldova in 2020, the process of dismantling these systems has been underway, with more progress on the horizon.
In this episode of Collectively Combating Kleptocracy, Victoria Popa (Anti-Corruption Partnership Consultant, Centre for Analysis and Prevention of Corruption in Moldova) joins Izabela Chmielewska (Program Manager, Anti-Corruption & Governance Center, Center for International Private Enterprise) to provide insights about the cyclical revolution, with knowledge informed by an extensive background in Moldova’s anti-corruption efforts, including the development of monitoring and evaluation frameworks, public administration integrity policy, and advocacy for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). Popa outlines the political and economic context that facilitated kleptocracy and ignited collective action efforts in Moldova while also discussing specific mobilization techniques, including the use of social media technology. Lastly, Popa discusses the critical role that activists, journalists, NGOs, and international organizations have played in the collective action movement and outlines the wider impact this has had in the pro-democratic fight against corruption in Moldova over time.
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Transcript
Announcer (00:03):
Welcome to the Collectively Combating Kleptocracy podcast series. This podcast is supported through a project on identifying successful collective action approaches against kleptocracy as part of the United States Agency for International Development Funded Democratic Elections and Political Processes Cooperative Agreement carried out by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening. It is co-implemented by the International Republican Institute and the Center for International Private Enterprise and accompanied by related case studies. The views expressed in this podcast are that of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States government.
Izabela Chmielewska (00:38):
My name is Izabela Chmielewska, and I am a program manager at the Anti-Corruption and Governance Center at CIPE, and today I am here with our podcast guest, Victoria Popa, who is an Anti-Corruption Partnership Consultant at the Center for Analysis and Prevention of Corruption in Chisinau, Moldova. She is a dedicated anti-corruption expert who has developed monitoring and evaluation frameworks and promoted integrity with Moldova’s SME sector and public administration. Victoria has been a leader in policy strengthening digital tool development and strategic litigation. She effectively collaborates with global stakeholders to enhance transparency and accountability, which underscores her key role in Moldova’s overall anti-corruption efforts. Welcome Victoria.
Victoria Popa (01:27):
Hello Izabela, and thank you for the invitation.
Izabela Chmielewska (01:30):
Of course. We are so happy to have you here. Let me start with the first question. What was the context in which the Collective Action Movement took place in Moldova?
Victoria Popa (01:39):
I should mention that while researching and analyzing this concept in Moldova, I found out that there were two factors that drove such collective action movements in Moldova, and I noticed the cyclical character of this. So on one hand we have the state capture legacy. This is a legacy of a post-Soviet era with the chaotic privatizations. We had the criminal group special services infiltrated in different elites. In the political group, we had the post-communist regime with the state capture following characteristics we have had and still have laws tailored for private interests, also bribery for fostering opportunities. On the other hand, we have an abuse of anti-corruption pretended reforms and the political discourse that is being used because since the independence, the elites used this anti-corruption rhetoric without genuine intent to change the state core while adopting laws as a facade for external and the internal audiences.
(02:58):
In Moldova the phenomenon of institutional, I would say mimicry is very pronounced because the structures of democracy are set in place and are adopted, but these serve as a mask for the real extractive practices. Government and anti-corruption agencies are established with a lot of applause. They are projecting the image of commitment to democratic norms and rule of law. However, these operate under the influence of kleptocratic networks. These ensure that the genuine reform is stifled while the appearance of progress is maintained. And we have this with the creation of a different anti-corruption specialized institutions, pro-European alliances also turned out to have interests being promoted in the same manner. I would say that this kind of mimicry actually undermines the integrity of the state institutions. They are hindering the consolidation of genuine system of integrity in Moldova.
Izabela Chmielewska (04:14):
Yeah, absolutely. It sounds like there would be a lot of frustration coming from civil society, private sector, and the general public when there’s just mimicry of policy reform and kleptocracy lives on. So what was that tipping point for collective action to make a real difference in anti-kleptocracy movement?
Victoria Popa (04:36):
I think that here we have some typical characteristics because the first situation I named resulted in a collective action movement being mobilized through technology. And we had the protests in 2009. We had such a phenomenon like the Twitter revolution because on the evening of April 6th when the Central Elections Commission announced the results of the elections, a mass of young people, let’s say entered in the capital of Chisinau to voice their grievance of the government, they were having a silent protest with candles symbolizing the funerals of the democracy because there were allegations of electoral fraud and dissatisfaction with the ruling communist party’s victory in the elections. Next day, thousands of demonstrators, students and academia, mostly young people came to protests. People were very disappointed by the results of the elections. Although no evidence of fraud was brought, I would say this was a historical moment because we had the massive protests.
(05:57):
These were the first since the independence in 1991, such huge protests on the cause of integrity and abuse by the state. Allegedly these protests intentionally resulted in violence and perpetrators in the building of Parliament. But the investigations didn’t lead to a clear result, these protests were quickly escalated into violence and there were demonstrators who set fire, for example, in the Parliament building as well as other administrative offices by the presidency. In response to this, the government back then announced a series of measures aimed at addressing the grievances and the restoring calm to the country. This included the promises of electoral reforms, investigations into allegations of fraud. We witnessed back then significant political changes over the following months and years. The civil society organizations and opposition parties became more vocal in their call for democracy reforms and accountability. I would say that these efforts were to improve transparency and strengthen the institutions to prevent future incidents of fraud.
(07:35):
And by the next elective episode, which took place in 2010, while still there were some concerns about the electoral process, the elections were generally seen as an improvement compared to the previous ones. The results reflected the shift in the political dynamics. The opposition parties took significant gains out of this, and the ruling communist party lost its majority in the parliament for the moment. Also, while mentioning the tipping point of the collective action, I mentioned the cyclical character of these movements and on the part of the abuse of anti-corruption pretended the reforms and the political discourse. We had another tipping point in 2019. So 10 years later, another tipping point of collective action happened, and here we have a different reality closer to what we are currently facing. So in June 2019, Moldova faced a double government crisis having an internal political strife and the external pressures. We had the constitutional and the institutional impasse.
(09:03):
This was led by the formation of a coalition government following the parliamentary elections in February 2019 because after the elections, the parliament struggled to form a coalition government and they couldn’t do so until June 2019. While seeking a solution of this crisis and right in the moment when a coalition agreement was reached between the pro-European Alliance called AKUN and the pro-Russian Socialist party, another tipping point arrived, which was the constitutional crisis. Back then the constitutional court, which was seen as aligned with the socialist party or the pro-Russian political force in Moldova. The court issued a ruling declaring the dissolution of the newly formed parliament and calling for snap elections. This move was met with outcry from the opposition parties and from the civil society and was seen as an unconstitutional power grab. For a few days we had dual governments, so we had the constitutional court ruling, which led to the formation of two parallel governments in Moldova.
(10:34):
One under the alliance formed together with the party AKUN and a second one. This led to political tensions and the institutional paralysis, and it was a moment I remember of crucial uncertainty and instability. Of course, this led to street protests and the international concern. We had the widespread protests across the country. People were demanding the resignation of President Dodon and the socialist-led government, thanks to the international community, including the European Union and the United States, who expressed their concerns about the democratic backsliding, urging respect to the rule of law and called for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. I think the situation didn’t go any further almost immediately after the formation of the coalition government, tensions again arose within the newly established alliance, the members of this newly alliance, like in a classical case, were accusing each other of obstructing anti-corruption reforms and maintaining corrupt practices. This internal disputes actually led to striking on the newly established governmental coalition very soon after this.
Izabela Chmielewska (12:14):
Understood. Let me ask you a little bit more about who else was involved in instrumental change of this movement. You mentioned youth activists and opposition parties and sounds like there’s a lot of cogitation of what anti-corruption means, and I understand that parliamentary change is a big part of the 2019 moment of change, but also, at least from the United States perspective, the election of Maia Sandu was also a tipping point moment in a way for more anti-corruption reforms. But I understand that these reforms take a very long time and there is also judicial reform that needs to happen in tandem with the policy design and implementation. So two-pronged question really. Who else was this instrumental actor, especially in the current overcoming of the crisis since 2019? Wanted to also ask about the participation of the private sector and their incentives in making sure that anti-corruption happens in Moldova.
Victoria Popa (13:23):
Yes. I would say that now in 2019, I’m saying now because it’s very recent in our memory, I would say that it wasn’t a singular champion. Maybe it’s way better to say that it was a coalition that pushed their reform. On the one hand were the civil society organizations who had the vital role. They were empowered after previous collective action exercises and now activists and the grassroots movements were essentially in mobilizing citizens, organizing protests, advocating for democratic principles. And these organizations played a crucial role in building public support and pressure for political reforms. There were also, as you said, the opposition political parties, those who were aligned to the pro-European and anti-corruption agenda. These challenged the legitimacy of the dual government set up and they were very vocally advocating for constitutional order and democratic governance. And these vocal critics, which were, as you said, the AKUN Alliance and their ruling party, they engaged into a coalition that resolved actually the crisis.
(14:58):
We had also the independent media outlets, the journalists who also played the vital role in providing objective coverage of the crisis. They were exposing corruption and abuses of power. We have a strong organization of investigative journalists. We have strong anti-corruption organizations and economic think tanks who were revealing different kinds of kleptocratic schemes, abuses of power, and were challenging the anti-corruption institutions in holding the political leaders accountable. As you said, the private sector had a role while the general movement was driven by political actors, and the formal participation of the private sector wasn’t, I would say, publicly displayed.
(15:59):
We had a few significant incentives for private sector’s involvement, having such a crisis revolved around political disputes, allegations of corruption, and the concerns about the democratic governance. The collective action movement of the private sector was related directly to the economic interests and the incentives. The private sector was very much affected by the political developments and they had the direct stakes in the resolution of crisis. We have a group of interests that were among private sector that are aware that the political instability and the uncertainty has a major negative impact on the business environment over the investor’s confidence, over the economic stabilities. And these actors actually played the strong role in supporting the change towards destroying some legacies of the kleptocratic schemes.
Izabela Chmielewska (17:17):
I wanted to ask you about the role of your organization in supporting SMEs when it comes to navigating this very difficult climate of overcoming the Kleptocratic legacy. So could you tell me maybe a little bit more about the Center for Corruption Analysis and Prevention and how you are supporting SMEs, especially considering not only their level of untangling of embedded corruption, not just in Moldova, but in the region that’s also compounded by the current war in Ukraine. I know this is a little bit pivoting towards exactly what your organization does, but I think it’s very much related to this overarching ongoing efforts in order to stamp out corruption or at least reduce it mindfully in the longterm.
Victoria Popa (18:13):
I need to mention that my organization, the Center for Prevention and Analysis of Corruption is an NGO working in the anti-corruption and good governance area for already 20 years. We are dedicated to reducing corruption through research, policy advocacy, corruption proofing of legislation, and the capacity building initiatives. We have had a track record of various anti-corruption projects. We were specialized in the anti-corruption scrutiny of the draft laws while identifying in the laws, the hidden interests and the corruption risks. This is one of the ways how the organization has advocated for private sector’s interests for already 20 years and the organization is fighting the kleptocratic schemes using this tool. But also since 2017 in Moldova, we had a new anti-corruption strategy adopted. It was called the Anti-Corruption and Integrity Strategy. And it was the first time when policy document addressed the integrity of the private sector.
(19:49):
In this strategy, the private sector was appointed as one of the seven pillars of the national integrity system. And this was a window of opportunity for us actually, because in the same year in 2017, the parliament adopted a new integrity law, which also had outlined for the private sector a set of, I would say around 10 policies to be followed, implemented, and apply while interacting with the public sector. So we understood that helping and providing support and capacity building to SMEs in operating under the Integrity standards umbrella is pivotal path that we can take in our anti-corruption and integrity mandate. This is why we started to promote the implementation of the International Anti-Bribery Management System 37001 in the government sector and in the private sector. And we are promoting the implementation of the Anti-Bribery management System elements even within the small and medium-sized enterprises.
(21:24):
In order to establish procedures that would from the very beginning have this anti-bribery mandate included in all the operational procedures that an SME does. We have the objective together we strive to strengthen SME’s integrity while implementing the Anti-Bribery Management System elements of ISO 37001 in the SMEs, the beneficiaries of this initiative are actually the Organization for the Development of Entrepreneurship from the Republic of Moldova. Also, here we are trying to include and raise interests from the Ministry of the Development of Economy and Digitalization from the Economic Council, business associations and SME’s. In Moldova. We are aiming to promote and disseminate the Anti-Bribery Management System elements and the operational procedures that can be implemented by SME’s under their standards. And also we want to provide capacity building and training sessions for SME’s representatives on the ISO 37001 to provide them with templates for operational procedures and documents in order to empower them and help them implement the Anti-Bribery Management System.
(23:17):
While doing our research last years, we acknowledged that, of course, while the corruption is a major problem for Moldova, the presence of the procedures within the public and private sectors makes individuals resilient to corruption risks, to extortion, to abuses, to red tape. And this is why we are aiming to promote the Anti-Bribery Management System implementation across all the sectors in Moldova. And we are emphasizing here the SMEs because they are at the highest risks of corruption and we are trying to enhance their performance and facilitate for sustainable business growth in Moldova. We acknowledge that while we have this war in the neighboring country, Ukraine, and that together with the EU accession a lot of funds and new programs access to is promised to our SMEs, we understand that we need to empower them and help them to be resilient in addressing different corruption risks while also helping them to really use the funds for the business growth and not lose any of this in different corruption schemes.
Izabela Chmielewska (24:57):
Absolutely. It takes a very long time and a concentrated effort in order to make a difference, especially when it comes to policy implementation. It sounds like Moldova is making amazing progress when it comes to the design and passage of certain laws, but I think your organization is exemplary in how this looks on the ground and how this actually helps to ensure that there is a healthier private sector that is able to develop that is able to be more competitive and vibrant and resilient, as you said. So I want to ask about two more things. One is where there efforts to repress collective action going back to the overall anti-kleptocratic movement, and how did these activists navigate the repression attempts?
Victoria Popa (25:44):
Okay, so of course the tentatives to suppress the collective action movements were, I think it’s something normal to have a driving force from the opposite direction coming. I would say while seeing the news these days about the abuse happening in different countries, we didn’t have major, let’s say, police crackdowns or arrests of activists. I think since 2009, we didn’t have that or we had a few, but it happened until 2019. Now, we had at most tentatives of intimidation and harassment because we had the activists, journalists, opposition figures who faced intimidation from state authorities. We have investigations and proofs about surveillance threats, about different tactics to undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the collective action of movements and to discourage the participation of the opposing forces. And we also had the suppression of media freedoms because the oligarchs exerted control over media outlets. They were censoring coverage of protests, dissenting voices.
(27:27):
The journalists faced pressure and censorship with some of them even being targeted for their reporting on the protests and government crackdowns. I’m very glad that the activists employed various strategies to navigate this repression attempts. We had the solidarity and unity because doing public appeal, the networks of NGOs or journalists really rapidly were uniting together for the same idea. We had the legal advocacy because the activists are using legal advocacy and human rights mechanisms to challenge the, as I said, the surveillance and the different harassment acts. We also had the international advocacy because my colleagues and different activists also seeked support and solidarity from the international community. We are always speaking with our partners, with the diplomatic missions, with the human rights organizations about the pressure and the condemnation of human rights abuses. And we are trying to raise awareness each time when such cases appear. And we also, in this digital era have this digital activism on social media because the digital platform helped to disseminate quickly the information to organize protests, mobilize support, and this form of digital activism is helping collective action activists to maintain the momentum despite different repression attempts.
Izabela Chmielewska (29:36):
Yes, and I would say that these arcane methods of the oligarchs trying to exert their vested powers are difficult to break. But I think technology is one way that can effectively mobilize action. Just being mindful of a post-communist social norms of bribery and the level of progress that Moldova has made over time, especially when it comes to protecting the investigative journalists that are such a pivotal part of a healthy democracy. Seems like there are a lot of lessons to be learned and still progress to be made. But I just wanted to take a moment to applaud the progress that has been made in Moldova since independence and since these dual moments of change in 2019 and 2009.
(30:30):
So I have one more question for you, Victoria. What are some of the lessons learned from this experience? And I don’t mean just one window where there was the opportunity for change, but overall the trajectory of Moldova when it comes to fighting kleptocracy and how may Moldova’s experience, and especially the protests that have happened in Chisinau and for all of the progress that has been made, how is this relevant to other country context when sometimes protests can be a very emblematic way of showing that there is collective action, but everything that happens in the background like this stuff that your organization is doing when it comes to policy implementation, the, let’s say, less exciting or less visible ways of collective action, basically, what would you advise to other activists that are fighting corruption and are trying to be anti-corruption champions? What can they learn from Moldova’s experience?
Victoria Popa (31:33):
I would say that this is a closed circle. The lessons learned. On the one hand, Moldova has used such strategies where we as civil society organizations and the journalists and the business associations, we have understood the importance of coalition building. Back then, this is why I mentioned the 2009 case, because we understood the importance of coalition building and we are still making use of this strategy each time. This makes us resilient in face of repression, of the activists and the CSOs are demonstrating resilience and determination in face of any forms of repression. We are using legal advocacy, international solidarity, and the digital activism to navigate challenges and to continue to advocate our national interests. And on the other hand, using all these tools and even the digital tools and the advocacy and the solidarity would mean nothing if we wouldn’t have a small window of resiliency within our public institutions.
(33:10):
Because our case highlights actually the importance of building resilient democratic institutions who are capable of withstanding political turmoil and corruption. While we, as activists and anti-corruption practitioners are advocating for institutional reforms and are aiming to strengthen the rule of law and promote transparency, we wouldn’t be able to achieve results without having the resilient institutions hearing us and with very, very, very small steps providing us with what we are advocating for. So there is a need really to empower civil society and to address the general sense of frustration whenever major abuse comes. So it’s a closed circle. We succeeded moving this towards our interest, but of course we need to pay attention and each time use at least the same instruments to make ourselves heard and to move Moldova on the path of economic growth and democratic institutions.
Izabela Chmielewska (34:35):
And I see that this is happening thanks to your work and the coalitions that have emerged during this period of change. And one takeaway that I have for sure is that strong coalitions provide resilience in the face of repression, as you so succinctly said. And they really bolster democratic institutions with long-term policy advocacy and the day-to-day implementation that organizations such as yours do. And this is not done in silos, this is truly collective action against Kleptocracy. And I hope that our listeners can take away more lessons from this podcast and an upcoming case study. Thank you so much, Victoria, it’s been a pleasure to talk to you.
Victoria Popa (35:19):
Thank you, Izabela. Thank you very much.
Announcer (35:23):
Thank you for listening to this podcast. For more episodes from the Collectively Combating Kleptocracy series and the full report with case studies, please visit acgc.cipe.org, that’s acgc.C-I-P-E.org.
Published Date: September 17, 2024