Description
Beginning in November of 2013, then President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych withdrew from a long-desired and promised EU trade agreement in the interest of consolidating a kleptocratic regime with Russia. The events ignited a series of both violent and non-violent large-scale protests in Kyiv, spanning many months. The protests, named ‘Euromaidan’ shifted the tide in Ukrainian politics and represented one of Ukraine’s largest ever collective action movements against corruption and kleptocracy.
Vladimir Dubrovsky is this episode of Collectively Combating Kleptocracy’s guest, joining CIPE’s ACGC Program Manager Izabela Chmielewska, to discuss his personal insights into the Euromaidan protests. Vladimir has extensive experience working as a senior economist at Case Ukraine and as a chief expert at the Economic Expert Platform; and a rich experience working in macroeconomics, political institutional economics and governance and anti-corruption. Vladimir outlines the historical and political background leading up to the protests and uses his experience and insight to explore the events’ tipping points and mobilization mechanisms. He also discusses the outcome of the protest, noting the shift in collective action narrative in Ukraine, the existing needs for reform and the unification of civil society in response to recent conflicts.
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Transcript
Announcer (00:03):
Welcome to the Collectively Combating Kleptocracy podcast series. This podcast is supported through a project on identifying successful collective action approaches against kleptocracy as part of the United States Agency for International Development-funded Democratic Elections and Political Processes Cooperative Agreement carried out by the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening.
(00:24):
It is co-implemented by the International Republican Institute and the Center for International Private Enterprise and accompanied by related case studies. The views expressed in this podcast are that of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States government.
Izabela Chmielewska (00:38):
Our podcast guest today is Vladimir Dubrovskiy. He’s a senior economist at CASE Ukraine and a chief expert at Economic Expert Platform. He has a very rich experience across different areas, including macroeconomics, political institution economics, and governance, as well as corruption and other interdisciplinary topics.
(01:00):
He has worked with CIPE before and also the World Bank, UNDP, GDN, OECD, WEF, Transparency International, Chatham House, and other engagements with international programs regarding technical aid to governments, including the governments of Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. He is a principal author of a book, Eight Years after the Revolution of Dignity: What Has Changed in Ukraine during 2014-2021, which was published by Ibidem Press Berlin. He’s also an author of number of research papers and books on issues related to transformation Ukraine.
(01:37):
And today, we will be talking about the Revolution of Dignity and the collective movement against kleptocracy in Ukraine. Vladimir, welcome.
Vlad Dubrovskiy (01:46):
Hi. So, what was the context of this revolution?
Izabela Chmielewska (01:51):
Yes.
Vlad Dubrovskiy (01:51):
Ukraine has a history of fighting autocracies. Ukraine was never an autocracy in its history. It was under the autocracy of the Russian Tsar later Soviet times, but an autocratic regime in Ukraine is something alien. And unfortunately, it was such kind of regime. Autocratic and kleptocratic is… Of course, kleptocracy cannot go without an autocracy. It was a regime of President Viktor Yanukovych who was elected at the normal democratic elections.
(02:32):
But very soon after, he has demonstrated that he’s neglecting all of the democratic norms, the Ukrainian political culture, which is very inclusive, and so on and so forth, he came to, one of my colleagues say, to raid the country. So, to grabbed everything that he could. And he started very much widespread campaign on corporate trading. I mean, not the one with stock market but the one with gangsters, a campaign of mobilizing everything that he could control under his son’s personal influence.
(03:25):
Also, he organized the… We have industry of avoiding taxes, and he has centralized this industry and even forced the companies to use these methods, like missing trader and so on in order to avoid taxes, but paying commissions to him personally, and so on and so forth. So, there were lots of corruption schemes. They were especially flourishing during the football championship of 2012 preparation. There were lots of state procurement that came with huge kickbacks. And the society was pretty much tired of Yanukovych, of his style.
(04:18):
But there was still a hope that for geopolitical reasons, he would have to align with the European Union because all of the Ukrainian presidents had to somehow balance between Russia and the West in order of preserving their independence. And Yanukovych was, although he was pro-Russian, certainly pro-Russian, but he was still eager to keep control over Ukraine and not ready to cede it to the Russians.
(04:55):
And so, he played the game with the European Union to the Vilnius Summit in which he was supposed to sign an Agreement of Association with the European Union and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. But eventually, and not surprisingly, while being already in Vilnius, he refused to do it. And this happened on November 21st of 2013. And this was a trigger that actually triggered this revolution. When the people learned about this decision, it was a lot of anger. I personally was very much angry.
(05:43):
And then, when I came home, I found a Facebook post of Mustafa Nayyem, then journalist who invited people to gather on Maidan Square. This is the largest square in Kyiv and in the very center of the town and protest about this decision. So, I have quickly joined this protest along with my wife in the evening. And then, the people were there for the whole night, then for a few days after. And the categories of people have been changing. But still, it was an instant progress of the kind of occupy, which is quite usual for Ukraine.
(06:42):
There were already a few such kind of protests there, and so people were already aware of such kind of protests.
Izabela Chmielewska (06:56):
Thank you for sharing your personal insights. That’s absolutely relevant to I’m sure a lot of experiences that Ukrainian people had at the time. I wanted to ask what was the tipping point for collective action?
Vlad Dubrovskiy (07:08):
In a few days after, namely on the night of November 29th to November 30th, the Yanukovych government tried to disperse this protest. And not just to disperse, not just to somehow put the people out of the square, but also severely beat them, which was also very much unusual for Ukraine. It was usual practice for Russia, Belarus, and other repressive countries, but not for Ukraine. And those times there were students, my daughter was a student though, and she left by dawn just a few hours before this action started.
(07:58):
And a few dozen of students were severely beaten, fortunately not to death, but they were injured. And this created so much anger among all of the Ukrainian population, including even eastern Ukraine from which Yanukovych originated and where it was his core electorate and so on. Even there, more than half of people were against such measure in Kyiv. It was just very big anger.
(08:40):
The people came to the streets in March, larger scale. There was already dozen of thousands of people, and they came not with peaceful slogans like, “Yanukovych, please sign the agreement.” But with slogans, “Yanukovych, go home.” And so, when they demanded the perpetrators of this execution to be punished, and then they established really occupied infrastructure with tents, with stoves, and so on. It was cold season in Ukraine. So, this was actually at the beginning of this big protest.
Izabela Chmielewska (09:37):
Vlad, this sounds like a very difficult time to live through and witness. And you already mentioned the effort of Yanukovych to repress the collective action movement. Can you tell me how activists, including yourself and your daughter, navigated these repression attempts?
Vlad Dubrovskiy (09:55):
Fortunately, neither myself nor my daughter or wife were involved at the time of repressions. But yes, there were a few repressive episodes. And the first episode was… Actually, the tipping point was followed by very strong mobilization of the people. The second episode was in two weeks after. And also, it was followed by mobilization. So, when the people knew that the authorities are trying to disperse Maidan, they came to Maidan. And there was even a cartoon, “What is the difference between Ukraine and Russia?”
(10:53):
And in Russia, riot policeman runs over the crowd and the crowd runs from him. In Ukraine, he runs… or the crowd runs on him, not from him but on him. And there were clashes between the protesters and authorities, the riot police and the army. And these clashes were numerous. And actually, Maidan has ended up with such a clash when this clash involved firearms.
(11:33):
Before the end of February, there was no firearms. But the end of February, the final episode was already with firearms. And then, it has got so serious for the many people in the law enforcement and so on. So, they were not ready to such clashes. And eventually, they started deceiving Yanukovych. There were a few stages of escalation of violence. And finally, it ended up with a massacre of about 100 of protesters and a few dozens of policemen.
Izabela Chmielewska (12:23):
Understood. So, the levels of repression that progressively happened since the beginning of the protests in Maidan have become more and more violent, which is a huge concern. And I wanted to for a moment, just to go back to how this movement was mobilized. So, looking at the very beginning, but also as these violent repressions are happening, how is this movement not only mobilized but also sustained throughout this change cycle?
Vlad Dubrovskiy (12:58):
The main way of mobilization was Facebook. It started with the Facebook post, and then Facebook was the main channel for communication between the protesters and between protesters and their leaders, temporary leaders, and so on. People self-organized with Facebook. It appeared to be a very convenient tool for self-organization. It was a very powerful tool for mobilization, for coordination, and it was used from the very first to the last day of Maidan, and then remained as a very influential tool in Ukraine. Some people even said that in Ukraine, the source of power is Facebook.
Izabela Chmielewska (13:51):
Wow. Well, it’s good to hear that technology such as Facebook has positive uses for mobilization of anti-kleptocratic action, especially when it comes to a lengthy process that requires a lot of mobilization in general across all sectors. So, my next question actually pertains to the business sector. Did the movement incentivize participation of the private sector in the protests as well?
Vlad Dubrovskiy (14:20):
Yeah, sure. And it has made this protest sustainable because the protesters needed foods for their stoves, so they needed food and so on and so forth. And the ordinary people donated a lot. But of course, business could do more and it did more. The word is that even some oligarchs were involved, of course, not openly.
Izabela Chmielewska (14:51):
Interesting.
Vlad Dubrovskiy (14:51):
They somehow supplied Maidan with necessary goods. And also, it is very much important that in Ukraine, we have a middle class of small entrepreneurs, micro-business, self-employed that made a very substantial contribution both to the Orange Revolution before and then to Maidan. And then, also in between, they own Tax Maidan in order to defend their simplified taxation for micro-business. And it was also collective action.
(15:34):
And collective action has a very important feature they accumulate. So, when people participate in one collective action and second collective action, and so on, it succeed. Then, it is more likely that they will participate in the next action. And actually, the Orange Revolution and this Tax Maidan were a preparatory collective actions to the Revolution of Dignity because they both were successful, and they gave the people some experience in which they learned how to make such things, how to succeed, and also some confidence in their efforts. So, the people were confident that their collective action can really make a change.
Izabela Chmielewska (16:26):
Absolutely. I’ll ask you a question that just spurred up based on what you said, and I’m thinking the two successful iterations of change, the Orange Revolution and then Maidan as well as the Revolution of Dignity, how have these experiences prepared Ukraine for what is happening today with the second year of war caused by the invasion of Russia? Do you think that the resilience that Ukrainian people have and this drive for change partially came out of these movements that have been going on for many years preceding the current status?
Vlad Dubrovskiy (17:09):
Great. Yes, thank you for great question. Indeed. So, what happened in the first month of the Russian invasion two years ago, everybody who was on Maidan perceived as a large Maidan. Maidan on the scale of the whole country because the people were left to their own devices, the government barely functioned. And still, the life continued, the people self-organized to resist to the invasion. They organized even the military groups with some weapons and so on and went to fight Russians.
(18:02):
And so, it was a much collective action of much greater scale than all of Maidan’s. As I just said, Maidan’s were good sort of school for such kind of collective action. And also, this Maidan’s ended up with establishment of personal networks that later on worked for the movement of volunteers in helping Ukrainian army at Donbass. And later on, it helped us to survive the beginning of the Russian invasion.
(18:48):
And now, this movement of volunteers still work and the people that they donate to the army, to the needs of soldiers, and so on. So, it was a school that made Ukraine a school of resilience, school of dignity, if you like, that make Ukraine so resilient because it is not centralized. Unlike in Russia, there is no center that could be attacked and then decapitated. But there are lots of centers of decision-making that work instantly all of the time. And even if some of them get hurt, then others continue to work.
Izabela Chmielewska (19:35):
I think the power of the people within the overall collective action movement and the ability to self-organize, and as you described, the school of dignity, school of resilience is a really key part of success in the ongoing efforts to fight for Ukraine’s freedom.
(19:53):
And I wanted to ask you from this very rich experience that Ukraine has gone through and is still going through, but concentrating maybe just on the Revolution of Dignity itself, what are some of the key lessons learned from this experience that may be relevant to other countries and understanding the country context differ, but any lessons that you would want to convey, especially in regards to activists and other anti-corruption champions? What can they learn from this experience?
Vlad Dubrovskiy (20:27):
I’m not sure that these lessons are universal, that they are equally applicable to different countries because all of the countries are different in their social capital, in their culture, and so on. But I think for many countries the lesson would be, do not rely too much on the politicians. Do not rely on the official leaders. Be self-sufficient, be self-organizing, and be self-responsible.
(21:02):
So, in Ukraine, the key to our success was just there. The Orange Revolution was organized from top to down. But eventually, this top-down organization was muted by civil society. Civil society overshadowed this top-down organization. And it was one of the main reasons why political technology project has become a real revolution. But still, the people were overly confident in Yushchenko, the president candidate that was on the top of Orange Revolution, and they did not follow with any substantial actions after the revolution.
(21:55):
Whereas, after the Revolution of Dignity, or rather in the course of Revolution of Dignity, the people did not demobilize. They started the project of, for example, RPR, which I was the part, which was aimed at reforms following the revolution. Because revolution can just destroy something. It can open the way for the further reforms. But somebody should also push those reforms. Somebody should design them. Somebody should implement them, and so on.
[NEW_PARAGRAPH]And the main mistake after the Orange Revolution was the people demobilized and outsourced this to the authorities, to Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, and the authorities failed to implement their best wishes. But after the Revolution of Dignity, the civil society started to be the main player in the Ukrainian politics and policymaking. And even now, it remains one of the main players. I’m part of it, and it works.
Izabela Chmielewska (23:14):
I think the main part of what makes social capital so great and social cohesion in general is a very strong civil society that also works with government chambers that do want to make a difference and are truly reformists and also business partners from what you’re describing, of course, civil society is really the driving force and not just organized civil society, but ordinary citizens.
(23:42):
And I think that makes Ukraine really stand out from a lot of different movements that perhaps have a lot of momentum but don’t take the initiative to then do the very lengthy process of policy design and reform. And not only the tax reforms are important that you’ve mentioned that you work on too, but notably, Ukraine has one of the best examples of public procurement systems with Prozorro, which goes together with Dozorro, which really extends to what you just described with really large involvement of ordinary citizens and overall civil society. So, I want to take a moment if you wanted to comment on this.
(24:25):
Do you think, especially large-scale change that needs some support of international community too in some ways with the ongoing war or even like Prozorro? I wanted to ask you one more question beyond this one, but I wanted to just follow up and ask, what can the international community do in order to sustain the change that’s really coming up from the ground up from Ukrainian people?
Vlad Dubrovskiy (24:54):
First of all, it should learn the realities because unfortunately, the problem is that too many organizations have their own agenda, like the IMF, for example, their own manuals, textbooks, and so on. And they come with ready solutions without studying the things on the ground.
(25:14):
And these solutions sometimes work, sometimes they do not work, sometimes they do works then doubt them. So, the first thing is to study the subject of reforms, because of course there are many similarities between different countries, but there are also many differences. And very rarely there are some fundamental and universal descriptions that work everywhere.
(25:44):
Very often, you need to adjust it. Like for example, Prozorro that you mentioned is a unique system that was developed in Ukraine. It is unique in its transparency, in its ability to restrain the discretion of authorities. And it was developed by the Ukrainian civil society along with Ukrainian private sector. And only afterwards, it was supported by international organizations. I can give you another example. With judicial reform, we have huge problems in judiciary.
(26:24):
We have corrupt judges. We have dependent judges that, for example, prosecuted Maidan people for fake crimes. But the first advice that was given to Ukraine is that you need to make this court judicial branch of power independent. It was made, but it was done in the assumption that the most of judges are honest and they would somehow get rid of dishonest ones because they temper the profession’s reputation and so on.
(27:14):
But the opposite happened because this assumption was just wrong. And now, we are trying to make another kind of judicial reform with reloading of the main bodies of self-governance of judges. And this reloading happens through site forces with involvement of international representatives and representatives of the civil society and so on, not from the same judges. And it probably will work, we hope so, because it is tailored to the peculiarities of Ukraine.
(28:07):
So, my message to the international partners is that before making advice or the aid conditionality and so on, that’s all great, but before making this, you need to study the things on the ground and develop some adequate measures that would work in this particular environment.
Izabela Chmielewska (28:33):
I think country context is extremely important to consider whenever making any kind of intervention. And thank you also for mentioning the need for judicial reform. And even if the widely known tenet of democracy is rule of law, it looks different from country to country, especially dealing with compounded issues and a post-communist environment, as I know from my own country in Poland where there was lots of democratic backsliding despite progress.
(29:05):
So, this isn’t a common occurrence, but also something that we can all learn from while being mindful of particular country contexts in general. So, I have one last question for you, Vlad. Looking back, how would you rate the success of collective action of the Revolution of Dignity? And do you think that the movement was successful in achieving the desired outcomes?
Vlad Dubrovskiy (29:38):
Yes, I think it was successful. First of all, in the first stage goal after this severe beating of the students was to oust Yanukovych of power. And this did happen, although at high price, unfortunately, in terms of price, it was not that much successful, but it has achieved its goals. And then, Ukraine also restored the democracy. It restored the institution that was more democratic.
(30:14):
It has achieved its goal in terms of European integration. So, this agreement with EU was signed just a few months after the Yanukovych oust, right after the elections restored some of the legitimate authorities in Ukraine. And then, we have made a substantial progress in all directions, including geopolitical economy and so on. For example, now, this corporate writing is not that much problem as it used to be, and it is by no means centralized.
(31:04):
So, there are some bad cases, of course, but nothing like what happened at Yanukovych is ever possible in Ukraine. I think the same is with tax evasion. The same is with large-scale theft in the government procurement, and so on and so forth. So, I think that Ukraine has opened a way to further progress, and this is the main achievement we could expect out of such a one short event like Revolution. Because again, building something new is a lengthy process, but removing the obstacles to it could be done in one event like the Revolution of Dignity.
Izabela Chmielewska (32:00):
That’s a really good way to summarize our conversation, that change can be quick, but rebuilding things mindfully always takes time. And I wish that Ukraine will be able to rebuild itself as a stronger and more resilient country and use a lot of the tools and the energy that the world has seen in order to rebuild a much stronger democratic nation. So, I wish you and all of the Ukrainian people all the best. And thank you so much for all of the insights that you have shared with us today on this podcast.
(32:39):
And we will be distributing this throughout our CIPE microsite, and we’ll have an accompanied case study and lots of other resources to share with our listeners. So, thank you so much and take care.
Vlad Dubrovskiy (32:59):
Thank you, and hope it’ll be helpful for others.
Announcer (32:59):
Thank you for listening to this podcast. For more episodes from the Collectively Combating Kleptocracy series and the full report with case studies, please visit acgc.cipe.org. That’s acgc.cipe.org.
Published Date: September 19, 2024